STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE BUSINESS AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1974 TERM: STANDARD PRESSED STEEL AND COLONIAL PIPELINE
Walter Hellerstein * S OME years ago, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that efforts to reconcile its hundreds of decisions delineating the scope of state tax power over interstate business would be pointless I if not altogether futile.
2 This uncharacteristic display of candor hardly signaled the dawn of a new era of judicial consciousnessraising. Nevertheless, it reflected the Court's awareness that
• Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. 1 Speaking of the limitations imposed on state tax power by the commerce clause, the Court declared:
The history of this problem is spread over hundreds of volumes of our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the future. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) .
2 Addressing the constitutional inhibitions on the states' power to collect a use tax from an out-of-state vendor, the Court stated:
Despite the increasing frequency with which the question arises, little constructive discussion can be found in responsible commentary as to the grounds on which to rest a state's power to reach extraterritorial transactions or nonresidents with tax liabilities. Our decisions are not always clear as to the grounds on which a tax is supported, especially where more than one exists; nor are all of our pronouncements ... consistent or reconcilable. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954) . See also Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959) . The problem inspired one state court to wax classical:
It would be a Herculean, if not impossible task, to review and harmonize the myriad decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the subject of interstate commerce and exactly what incidents thereof may be constitutionally taxed by the States. The dissenting opinions in many of those cases make clear that the task of reconciling all the decisions is more difficult than was the task of Theseus as he threaded his way through the famous Cretan Labyrinth in search of the Minotaur. Ro% Stone Transfer Corp. v. Messner, 377 Pa. 234, 243-44, 103 A.2d 700, 705 (1954) .
3 Indeed, Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), was roundly condemned as further muddying the waters by "marking a recrudescence of the old, mechanical hnd meaningless legal literature, 9 and some suggested that these developments heralded a new epoch in state taxation of interstate business. 0 In light of the commotion spawned by Northwestern, developments in the field of state taxation of interstate business over the past 15 years may have been more modest than some had anticipated. While Congress produced an extensive and invaluable study of the problem 21 and from time to time evinces an interest in legislating broadly in the area, 22 it has nevertheless failed to act. Despite the strides the states have taken toward putting their own houses in order, 23 their efforts are presently being strenuously resistedthe case for the Northwestern States Portland Cement Company in the Supreme Court).
19 Northwestern and related developments were the focus of numerous individual pieces, e.g., Britton LAWYER 213 (1974) . 23 Under the shadow of federal restrictions on their taxing powers, the states have moved towards voluntary solution of a number of the problems raised by state taxation of Copyright 1976 Virginia Law Review, used by permission and to a large extent stymied-by multistate businesses. 4 Similarly, although it has issued some opinions of general significance, 2 5 the Court has for the most part remained on the sidelines, 2 6 perhaps in anticipation of congressional action. 207 (1960) . 26 The most striking recent example of the Court's reluctance to become embroiled in controversies involving state taxation of interstate business was its refusal-despite the urgings of the Tax Executives Institute, Inc., the Financial Executives Institute, the Na- product value, 32 has nine times been the subject of Supreme Court adjudication.
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A. The Decision
Standard Pressed Steel produced and sold industrial and aerospace fasteners-more readily identifiable as nuts and bolts. 3 It was a Delaware corporation with manufacturing plants in Pennsylvania, where it maintained its home office, and in California. Standard made substantial sales of its products to the Boeing Company, which was its principal customer in Washington . 35 The activities of Standard in the state of Washington derived exclusively from the duties performed there by the company's single resident employee and by its nonresident engineers, who visited the state for three days every six weeks. Standard maintained no inventory in the state, its sales dealings and negotiations were carried on directly 32 The general taxing provision reads:
There is levied and shall be collected from every person a tax for the act or privilege of engaging in business activities. Such tax shall be measured by the application of rates against value of products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of the business, as the case may be. between its out-of-state offices and Boeing, it received orders directly from Boeing and filled them by shipping directly to Boeing through a common carrier, and it received payments directly from Boeing. While Standard maintained and was directly billed for a telephone answering service listed in its own name, messages from this service were relayed to the resident employee for response and action.36
Standard's single employee permanently located in Washington during the period in question was Robert Martinson, an engineer whose primary responsibility was to consult with Boeing personnel regarding the company's anticipated needs for aerospace fasteners. 37 Operating out of his own home, Martinson devoted most of his time to transmitting this information to Standard's out-of-state offices, where Standard would determine whether to seek to "qualify" as a Boeing supplier of a particular fastener. If such a determination were made and Standard's sample fasteners met the requisite specifications, thus enabling it to become an "approved source," Martinson would be "bypassed completely" 38 in the subsequent negotiations between Boeing and Standard's out-of-state offices concerning the purchase of the fasteners. Martinson also spent a small percentage of his time ascertaining any difficulties Boeing had experienced with Standard's products and relaying this information to Standard's out-of-state engineers. In addition, he arranged meetings between Boeing engineers and groups of 36 While both the Washington Board of Tax Appeals and the state in its brief in the Supreme Court noted that during the early part of the period in question Standard maintained its own sales office in Seattle, BTA 1; Brief for Appellee at 7, no mention of that fact is made in the opinion either of the Supreme Court or the state court of appeals, and it is presumably without decisional significance.
37 Despite the apparent similarity between Standard's relationship to Boeing and to its other Washington customers, see note 35 supra, the state contended that "Martinson confined his activities exclusively to representing Standard in its relation with Boeing, his superiors being of the view that other Washington customers did not generate enough business to make it worth his time." Brief for Appellee at 7-8. This would seem to be a rather damaging concession for the state to make insofar as it sought to tax Standard's receipts from its sales to Washington customers other than Boeing.
except In a brief opinion, the United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. 3 The Court posed the due process issue as whether the "in-state activities were so thin and inconsequential as to make the tax on activities occurring beyond the borders of the State one which has no reasonable relation to the protection and benefits conferred by the taxing State." 44 It thus collapsed into a single question two separate inquiries: (1) whether the tax was in fact imposed on out-of-state activities and (2) whether the tax was reasonably related to protection and benefits conferred by the taxing state. 45 The Court failed to address even its own question and instead restated the issue in the classic but imprecise formulation of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.: 46 "whether the State has given anything for which it can ask return." 47 It then offered the conclusory response that "the question in the context of the present case verges on the frivolous," 4 citing the fact that Martinson "made possible the realization and continuance of valuable contractual relations between [Standard] and Boeing." 49 The Court thereby finessed the important question whether the in-state activity in which Martinson engaged was fairly measured by the unapportioned gross receipts of Standard's sales to Boeing-a consideration neither the parties 50 nor the court below "I had had the temerity to ignore. 43 419 U.S. 560 (1975) . 44 Id. at 562. 45 The Court appears at this point in its opinion to be assuming that the tax is imposed "on activities occurring beyond the borders of the State," although perhaps it is simply stating what it deems appellant's argument to be. If it is not, its statement is inconsistent with the final paragraph of its opinion, which states that the "activities taxed" are "intrastate. 51 As the Washington Court of Appeals stated, after concluding that Martinson's activities constituted a "sufficient peculiarly local and distinct taxable incident within the State of Washington," 10 Wash. App. at 50, 516 P.2d at 1046:
Our inquiry does not end here, however, for even when there is a peculiarly local activity, the measure of the tax must be reasonably related to those local incidents. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra. A tax measured by gross receipts from sales by a foreign corporation to customers within the state must be closely related to the local activities of the corporation, for due process requires "some definite link, Finally, after noting that the taxpayer had failed to demonstrate that imposition of Washington's tax would subject it to multiple taxation, the Court ended its opinion with the puzzling comment that the tax "is 'apportioned exactly to the activities taxed,' all of which are intrastate." 62 This disposed of the entire apportionment issue in a single cryptic phrase, yet left unanswered the question how an "unapportioned" tax on gross receipts can be "apportioned exactly" to activities which were only partially responsible for their creation. 
B. The Nexus Perplex
Among the key issues raised by Standard Pressed Steel was whether the imposition of Washington's gross receipts levy upon Standard was consistent with the due process requirement that there be "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." 64 The Court referred to this "nexus" issue 65 in its discussion of the Norton case, adverting to "the burden of showing a nexus between the local office and interstate sales-whether a nexus could be assumed and whether the taxpayer had carried the burden of establishing its immunity." 66 But it did not pause to consider how this requirement applied to the facts in Standard, an omission that becomes readily understandable when we measure the distance the Court has traveled since Norton.
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue 67 is the seminal decision in a line of cases that have raised perplexing nexus issues in forces, and advised as to promotional and training plans. He also advised on used car inventory control. He worked out with the dealer estimated needs over a 30-, 60-, and 90-day projection of orders. General Motors also had in Washington service representatives who called on dealers regularly, assisted in any troubles experienced, and checked the adequacy of the service department's inventory. They conducted service clinics, teaching dealers and employees efficient service techniques. 419 US. at 563. The Court in General Motors had described this as constituting "a substantial local business" and "a maze of local connections." 377 U. connection with the application of a state's unapportioned gross receipts tax to an out-of-state vendor making sales to in-state customers. The unapportioned character of the levies has forced the Court to fashion its own mechanism for determining whether state tax power has been exerted solely over receipts that arise from the taxpayer's activities within the taxing state. s This may suggest that we are actually dealing with an apportionment question masquerading as a nexus question, a possibility that is addressed below. 9 The Court, however, has approached the issue as a nexus question, and lawyers will consequently continue to address it as such; it may therefore be useful to examine the issue in these terms despite the possibility that more appropriate analytical approaches exist.
Norton involved an Illinois tax imposed "upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail" 70 and measured by the gross receipts of the business. The taxpayer was a Massachusetts manufacturer and vendor of abrasive machines and supplies with a branch office and warehouse in Chicago from which it made local sales. Illinois assessed its levy upon the gross receipts of all of Norton's sales to Illinois customers, which included sales resulting from (1) Direct over-the-counter purchases at the Chicago office; (2) Orders filled in Massachusetts but received by and/or shipped via the Chicago office; and (3) Orders sent directly to Massachusetts and filled by direct shipment to Illinois customers.
The Court initially noted that "[u]nless some local incident occurs sufficient to bring the transaction within its taxing power, the vendor is not taxable." 71 Since Norton had satisfied this test by having "gone into the State to do local business," 72 the Court The taxes imposed are levied only on that portion of the taxpayer's net income which arises from its activities within the taxing State. These activities form a sufficient "nexus between such a tax and transactions within a state for which the tax is an exaction." 69 See text at notes 97-136 infra. Copyright 1976 Virginia Law Review, used by permission next confronted the question whether Norton's local activity was sufficiently related to the assertion of state tax power to justify the exaction. First, it laid down the basic evidentiary rule that all the sales at issue were presumed to be related to the local activity; "only by showing that particular transactions are dissociated from the local business and interstate in nature" 13 can a taxpayer rebut this presumption and avoid taxation on such transactions. Turning to the facts, the Court held that the Illinois court's judgment "attributing to the Chicago branch income from all sales that utilized it either in receiving orders or distributing the goods was ... permissible," 7" since the taxpayer-and here the Court fleshed out its "dissociation" test-had "not established that the services rendered by the Chicago office were not decisive factors in establishing and holding this market" and "no other source of customer relationship [had been] shown." 7' Hence sales in categories (1) and (2) above gave rise to taxable receipts. As to category (3), however, the Court declared that these sales were "so clearly interstate in character that the State could not reasonably attribute their proceeds to the local business," 76 and they were therefore nontaxable.
Norton seemed to establish reasonably concrete and comprehensible criteria for determining an out-of-state vendor's exposure to gross receipts tax liability. But in Field Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington, 77 the next case in this line, the Norton construct began to show some strain. Field, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, maintained a substantial sales force in the state of Washington to market two sets of its books. Field's Washington sales force of some 175 Washington residents was supervised and trained by a local sales office that also processed orders and down payments for transmittal to Illinois, handled local promotions, and secured credit investigations. In contrast to Norton, where the purely local aspects of the taxpayer's business generated some admittedly taxable sales, all the orders in Field Enterprises were accepted by the taxpayer's out-of-state office, and there was thus no purely local transaction upon which In the instant case, it cannot be denied that the services rendered by the taxpayer's Seattle office are decisive factors in establishing and holding the market in this state for its publications. 8 The Supreme Court got the hint. Its entire opinion reads:
The judgment is affirmed. Norton Company v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE HAR-LAN are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. 1 Field Enterprises thus left unclear the extent to which the existence of some "distinctly local" business remained a necessary predicate for the imposition of a gross receipts tax upon an out-of-state vendor." 2 If the waters were slightly muddied after Field Enterprises, it required a major dredging operation to clean them up after General Motors Corp. v. Washington. 3 At issue was Washington's business and occupation tax as applied to an out-of-state wholesaler and measured by the unapportioned gross receipts from sales of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories delivered in the state. General Motors' activities in Washington were extensive: it engaged in promotional and supervisory work through its local employees to foster sales and preserve the quality of its dealer organization, it maintained a warehouse from which some parts and accessories were sold to local dealers, and it had a local branch office which assisted Washington dealers in getting better service on their orders. General Motors conceded the taxability of receipts from sales made by its local warehouse but contested the state's power to tax receipts from sales of items shipped from its out-of- In addressing the status of the disputed receipts, the Court appeared to reiterate the Norton rule but with an odd twist. Whereas in Norton it had stated that once the taxpayer had come into the state to do local business, it could avoid taxation "only by showing that particular transactions are dissociated from the local business and interstate in nature," s4 in General Motors it stated that the taxpayer had "the burden of showing that the operations of these [General Motors] divisions in the State 'are dissociated from the local business and interstate in nature.' " "' Any hope that this slippage might have been inadvertent was dashed when the Court turned to specifics. No longer was the sufficiency of the relationship between local activity and a gross receipts levy on an out-of-state vendor to be tested by the manageable criterion of whether the transactions producing the receipts were "associated" with such activity. For this the Court substituted a metaphysical "test": whether "the bundle of corporate activity.. . [was] so enmeshed in local connections" 86 as to form a sufficient basis for the levy. By inquiring whether the aggregate of corporate activity giving rise to disputed sales had sufficient local connections, 7 the Court abandoned a nexus standard requiring that taxable receipts emanate from transactions with a tangible and demonstrable link to local activities. It thereby created the possibility that the shapeless criterion of a locally "enmeshed" "bundle of corporate activity" would be used as a rhetorical device to sweep into the state tax collector's grasp all of a taxpayer's gross receipts from sales to in- Less than a year after General Motors the Court handed down a decision indicating that the nexus requirement still had a role to play in limiting the power of a state to tax sales made by out-of-state vendors. American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965). At issue was an Idaho excise tax levied, inter alia, on the "receipt" by licensed dealers of motor fuels within the state. The petitioner, a Delaware corporation and a licensed dealer in Idaho, had effected a sale of gasoline for eventual use in Idaho through delivery to the federal government in Utah on the basis of a bid it had submitted there, in response to the government's invitation therefor and acceptance thereof in the state of Washington. The In effect, this taxpayer's nightmare came true in Standard Pressed Steel. Standard's in-state activities amounted only to those attributable to its single resident employee and the group of nonresident engineers who visited the State for some 25 days per year. None of Standard's local activity was directly involved with the transactions which gave rise to the receipts Washington sought to tax; orders, shipments, negotiations, and payments were all handled between Boeing and Standard's out-of-state offices. 8 9 The Court, however, concluded that Martinson's critical role in making "possible the realization and continuance of valuable contractual relations between appellant and Boeing" 90 created a sufficient link between Standard's in-state activities and its Washington sales to justify a tax upon all of them.
If General Motors blurred the nature of the requisite relationship between the local activity and the interstate transaction, Standard Pressed Steel carried this process one step further by employing a nexus criterion that freed the local activity from the specifics of the transaction generating the allegedly taxable receipts. While General Motors suggested that the Court was taking a more relaxed view of the necessity of matching local activity to interstate sales on a transaction-by-transaction basis, this view seemed to be predicated on the existence of General Motors' "substantial local business" 9' and its "maze of local connections." 92 These placed the state court's decision "within the realm of permissible state had prevailed below on the grounds that the sales transaction in question amounted to a "receipt" by the Idaho dealer within the purview of Idaho's taxing power because the company knew the fuel would be imported into and used in Idaho and because it had been authorized to do business in the state. The Supreme Court reversed. It admitted that there is a strong inference that, once a corporation "pursuant to permission given, enters a State and proceeds to do local business," id. at 458, the requisite nexus "exists between the State and transactions which result in economic benefits obtained from a source within the State's territorial limits." Id. But it went on to point out that the corporation "can ... exempt itself by a clear showing that there are no in-state activities connected with out-of-state sales," which it had done since its "transfer of gasoline was unquestionably an out-of-state sale vis-a-vis Idaho and entirely unconnected with its business in that State." Id.
89 Indeed, the state conceded that "... in-state activities pertaining to claimed exempt wholesale transactions were not directly related to obtaining and processing orders." Brief for Appellee at 38. 90 94 the Court seems to have liberated the states completely from the restraints of Norton. Whether one looks to the enmeshed-bundle-of-corporate-activity standard or the making-contractual-relations-possible standard, the departure from the concrete criterion of Norton that the Court purported to embrace-the demonstration of "a nexus between the local office and interstate sales" 95 -is plain.
In sum, the force of the nexus limitation, employed over the years by the Court as an inhibition on state taxing power, has been eroded-at least in the area of gross receipts taxation-as the principles underlying it have become mired in conceptual quicksand. While the multistate business may appear to be the victim of these developments, recent history suggests that the business community is capable of inducing "corrective" action when sufficiently disturbed. 96 93 Id., quoting Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 538 (1951). 94 Understandably concerned with the sparseness of Standard's in-state activity in relation to the exercise of state tax power over Standard's sales, Washington had argued for the adoption of such a standard:
These 
C. Finessing the Apportionment Issue
The unsatisfactory disposition of the nexus question in Standard Pressed Steel may represent an unsuccessful attempt by the Court to solve an apportionment problem with analytical tools illsuited to the task. For the determination whether a critical relationship exists between local activity and assertion of state tax power may be no more than a crude way of identifying the constitutionally appropriate tax base. Yet the search for such a tax base has traditionally been viewed as an apportionment rather than a nexus question. When dealing with property, income, and capital stock taxes, the states have historically relied on apportionment formulas to divide the tax base of an interstate enterprise equitably among those jurisdictions having a legitimate claim to part of that base.
7
This historical pattern might logically have suggested a solution to the problem raised by the gross receipts tax at issue in Standard Pressed Steel, in light of the inadequacy of the nexus analysis in this regard as well as the Court's insistence over the years that proper apportionment is one of the constitutional touchstones in determining the validity of a gross receipts tax on interstate operations. 98 Nevertheless, the Court barely touched on the apportionment question. It noted that the Washington levy was unapportioned; 9 it quoted a paragraph from an earlier opinion that referred to the fact that "the tax, measured by the entire volume of the interstate commerce in which [the taxpayer] participates, is not apportioned to its activities within the state"; 100 and it "analyzed" the issue in two sentences:
payer's] agents in California had no connection with the sale of its products." National Geographic Soc'y v. The Court's reliance on Ficklen, which neither party cited in its briefs, was misplaced. Ficklen involved a Tennessee tax levied upon the "gross yearly commissions, charges, or compensations"' 1 0 2 of those engaged in the brokerage business. The taxpayers were general merchandise brokers domiciled in Tennessee, whose commissions derived entirely or substantially from orders solicited from local customers and sent to out-of-state vendors, who filled the orders by shipping the goods directly to the purchaser. In sustaining the levy over commerce clause objections, the Court stated:
[W]here a resident citizen engages in general business subject to a particular tax the fact the business done chances to consist, for the time being, wholly or partially in negotiating sales between resident and non-resident merchants, of goods situated in another State, does not necessarily involve the taxation of interstate commerce, forbidden by the Constitution.
103
Fairly read, Ficklen might well stand as authority for taxing Martinson upon commissions paid to him on the basis of Standard's sales to Washington's customers. To suggest that it further stands as authority for taxing Standard upon receipts from such sales is a logical leap of some distance. For it assumes that the presence of a Martinson in the taxing state eliminates the distinction, for purposes of gross receipts taxation, between local brokerage activity and interstate sales activity. Although the line between these two classes of activity may sometimes be thin, there is nevertheless a "distinction between the sedentary and therefore more localized characteristics of brokerage and the boundary-straddling aspect of interstate sales." 104 This distinction does not disappear simply by reference to Gwin, White's gloss on Ficklen. The tax in Ficklen was plainly "unapportioned" in the sense that the tax base was not divided by some method attributing a proportionate share of the taxpayer's gross receipts to the taxing state. 0 5 By characterizing the tax as "apportioned exactly to the activities taxed, all of which were intrastate," 106 the Gwin, White Court presumably meant that the tax in Ficklen was effectively measured by gross receipts of brokers' commissions that were generated by intrastate activities, namely the brokers' solicitation of sales from local customers. But to characterize the tax in Standard as similarly "apportioned" to "'activities taxed,' all of which are intrastate," 107 is another matter.
The only intrastate activities carried on by Standard in Washington were those of Martinson and Standard's visiting engineers. Thus, the premise underlying the justification for imposing an unapportioned gross receipts tax on Standard-that its intrastate activities were related to receipts Washington sought to tax as the brokers' intrastate activities in Ficklen were related to commissions Tennessee sought to tax-has no support in fact.
If this factual disparity were the function only of judicial carelessness or uncertainty regarding the definition of a properly "apportioned" gross receipts tax, careful analysis of the relevant precedents might clarify the issue. The problem, however, is more fundamental. There is a doctrinal disparity in the Court's treatment of the apportionment issue in Standard Pressed Steel. Despite its insistence that taxes measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce must be "fairly apportioned to the commerce carried on within the taxing state," 108 the Court has nevertheless sustained unapportioned taxes on the gross receipts from interstate sales. 0 9 105 While commentators have routinely described the tax in Ficklen as "apportioned," see IT'. BEANMAN, supra note 82, at 2-6; P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 185 n.16; but see Dunham, supra note 3, at 221, perhaps in reliance on the Court's statement in Gwin, White, it is apparent from examining the statute, 145 U.S. at 4, as well as the opinion, that the tax was not by its terms apportioned.
106 305 U.S. 434, 440 (1939 Of course, it would make analytic nonsense to talk about a "fairly apportioned" "unapportioned" tax if the concept of "apportionment" were intended to have any real meaning here. 10 Instead, what seems to have happened in cases like Standard is that the Court, while paying lip service to the apportionment principle,"' has ignored it in fact and has looked to other factors to determine the constitutionality of taxes imposed on the unapportioned gross receipts from interstate sales activity." 2 Notwithstanding doctrinal variations," 3 and assuming that nexus requirements have been satisfied," 4 over the past four decades gross receipts taxes on interstate sales have generally been sustained when imposed by the state to which the goods were shipped "' and prohibited when imposed by the state from which the goods were sent. 16 While Standard Pressed Steel thus falls within a class of unapportioned gross receipts levies the Court has sustained, it leaves at least two questions unanswered. First, why has the Court strayed from the apportionment principle in judging the constitutionality of gross receipts taxes on interstate sales activity? And, second, is this anomaly justified?
The answer to the first question would seem to lie in the fact that the Court, when dealing with levies measured by receipts from interstate sales, has analogized gross receipts taxes to retail sales 110 Indeed, T.R. Powell was of the opinion that gross receipts taxes on interstate sales were not susceptible to fair apportionment by formula. Powell, supra note 104, at 743; cf. W. BEAMAN Because retail sales and use taxes are consumer taxes which are separately stated, collected from the purchasers, and imposed on a transaction-by-transaction basis, apportionment of such levies has never been viewed as a practicable solution to the commerce clause problems that such taxes raise."
8 Instead, the Court in effect has had to decide whether the state from which the goods were sent, the state to which the goods were shipped, or both, or neither would be permitted to tax retail interstate sales.
19
As the preceding discussion suggests, the Court has tended to allow the state of destination to tax such transactions while forbidding the state of origin from doing so. The application of what is essentially a single constitutional doctrine relating to the taxability of receipts from interstate sales may thus explain the deviation from the apportionment principle in cases involving gross receipts taxes on interstate sales. The question remains, however, whether the deviation is warranted. In cases such as Norton, which involve consumer-type gross receipts taxes on interstate sales, 20 considerations of practicality 117 The high-water mark for the conscious adoption of this approach was probably Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944), involving the application of Indiana's gross income tax to receipts from three categories of sales.aransactions:
In light of our recent decisions it could hardly be held that Indiana lacked constitutional authority to impose a sales tax or a use tax on these transactions. But if that is true, a constitutional difference is not apparent when a "gross receipts" tax is utilized instead. Id. at 348. Although the strict equivalence between sales, use, and gross receipts taxes has not been maintained, see, e.g., Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951) (more substantial "local incidents" required for imposition of gross receipts than for sales or use tax); WiLL1s COMMiTTE REPORT and administrability do justify the approach the Court has taken. But cases such as Standard do not involve consumer-type gross receipts taxes. Rather, they involve general business taxes measured by the gross receipts of the enterprise; 121 like other business taxes, they are neither separately stated nor imposed on a transaction-bytransaction basis.
12 2 Hence one may seriously question the appropriateness of a rule for general business taxes which seems to have been developed with consumer taxes in mind. -3 There appears in fact to be no theoretical justification for deviating from the apportionment principle for determining the taxability of business activity in the state simply because an enterprise's gross receipts, rather than its net income or capital stock, are the measure 124 of such activity. As Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent in General Motors, "if commercial activity in more than one state results in a sale in one of them, that State may not claim as all its own the gross receipts to which the activity within its borders has contributed only a part." 125 Indeed, it is startling to find the Court more tolerant of an unapportioned levy measured by gross receipts that "affects each transaction in proportion to its magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable or otherwise" 126 than it would be of such a levy measured by net income that "does not arise at all unless a gain is shown over and above expenses and losses, and . . . cannot be heavy unless the profits are large." 127 There is, however, one more piece in the mosaic that provides a plausible explanation-though not a theoretical justification-for the Court's failure to insist upon true apportionment of general business taxes measured by gross receipts. It has long been established that excise taxes on manufacturing, producing, and extracting activities may be imposed by the states on the unapportioned gross receipts from such activities."-" The Court has considered these activities to be "local" ir nature, and it has permitted the states to measure the value of the intrastate activity by the gross receipts therefrom notwithstanding intimate connections between intrastate and interstate activity. Thus, in American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis 1 2 9 the Court upheld an excise tax on a manufacturing business measured by the unapportioned value of the products sold even though they were sold in interstate commerce.
Such cases are stumbling blocks in the way of any broad-based apportionment solution to the problem of multiple taxation in the gross receipts tax area. So long as they remain good law, an interstate enterprise might be subject to multiple taxation upon its gross receipts whether or not apportionment is required in cases like Standard Pressed Steel. Justice Goldberg's dissent in General Motors Corp. v. Washington exposes this difficulty.°3 0 After indicating that Washington imposes a tax on both manufacturers and wholesalers but exempts the manufacturer from the tax if it has already paid the wholesaler tax, he noted that an out-of-state firm manufacturing goods in a State having the same taxation provisions as does Washington would be subjected to two taxes on interstate sales to Washington customers. The firm would pay the producing State a local manufacturing tax measured by sales 127 United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918) . From an economic standpoint, however, in a perfectly competitive market the overall impact on business behavior of a tax on gross receipts would not be predictably different from the impact of a tax on net income producing the same amount of revenue. infra. This assumes that the Court thought about these matters in the first place, which may be a questionable assumption.
The Standard opinion touched upon one other point that merits brief attention. Since Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938), a key criterion for determining the validity of a state tax on an interstate business has been whether the tax imposes a "multi:le" or "cumulative" burden upon interstate commerce. Id. at 255-56; see note 6 supra. As originally formulated, the rule appeared to be couched in the language of possibility rather than certainty, i.e., whether multiple burdens were capable of being imposed, not whether they actually had been. In the end, the apportionment analysis adopted by the Court in Standard proves to be as unrefined a method for identifying the tax base of an interstate enterprise as the nexus analysis criticized earlier. We may nonetheless take some solace in the fact that the body of law to which the Court has turned in these cases, however unsuited to the scrutiny of general business taxes, has the virtue of being relatively settled. In Standard Pressed Steel the Court revealed its latest thinking on this subject:
We noted in General Motors that a vice in a tax on gross receipts of a corporation doing an interstate business is the risk of multiple taxation; but that the burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate it .... The corporation made no such showing there. Nor is any effort made to establish it here. 419 U.S. at 563. While invoking the notion of "the risk of multiple taxation" as a criterion for evaluating the validity of a gross receipts tax under the multiple burden standard, the Court nonetheless appears to be adhering to the Northwestern/General Motors approach in refusing to deal in abstractions and insisting that the taxpayer make a palpable showing that the risk exists. Just what the taxpayer must show, however, remains unclear. Standard conceded that Washington's levy did not actually subject it to a multiple tax burden, Jurisdictional Statement at 14, but argued that it was exposed to the risk that California or Pennsylvania would impose similar taxes measured by its gross receipts, thereby creating such a burden. Brief for Appellant at 29-30. The state responded that inasmuch as an unapportioned tax on gross receipts from interstate sales could, under established case law, be imposed solely by the state of destination, neither the actuality nor the risk of multiple burden could exist in the instant case since the state of origin was forbidden from imposing such a levy. Brief for Appellee at 46-47. Although it did not address the state's underlying premise that Pennsylvania and California were without power to impose a gross receipts levy on Standard's sales to Washington customers, the Court may have been adopting that position sub silentio in rejecting Standard's argument that it was subject to the risk of multiple taxation. Indeed, if this was not the Court's position, the alternative would be difficult to reconcile with-the recent comment in Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 668 (1975) : "Nor, we may ad, , can the constitutionality of one State's statutes affecting nonresidents depend upon the present configuration of the statutes of another State." 134 421 U.S. 100 (1975) .
135 See text at notes 30-33 supra.
Copyright 1976 Virginia Law Review, used by permission " 'the perennial problem of the validity of a state tax for the privilege of carrying on, within a state, certain activities' related to a corporation's operation of an interstate business." 136
A. The Tax-Immune Privilege of Doing Interstate Business-A Bit of Background
One of the fundamentals of commerce clause learning is that an enterprise doing exclusively interstate business cannot constitutionally be subjected to a state tax imposed on the privilege of doing business in that state. 37 The doctrine grew out of a logicalbut not necessary 1 8 -inference the Court drew from the proposition that the commerce clause precludes a state from preventing an out-of-state corporation from engaging in interstate business within its borders. 39 After concluding that a state was barred from imposing a tax or fee upon a foreign corporation as a condition to commencing business in the state,' 40 the Court extended the principle to forbid a tax on the privilege of doing business, as applied to a foreign corporation doing exclusively interstate business in the taxing state, even though the tax was not levied as a condition to commencing business.' 4 ' Nor did it make any difference that both foreign and domestic corporations and interstate and intrastate business were taxed on a nondiscriminatory basis. 4 2 Over the years, however, as judicial attitudes towards state tax power became more generous, significant inroads were made on the doctrine that the privilege of doing interstate business was immune from state taxation. The Court found taxable "local See generally P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 61-63 incidents" of interstate business activity, and thus chipped away at the scope of the privilege. 43 It developed the multiple taxation doctrine 144 that undermined the basis for the tax immunity 145 and led to distinctions between cases that became increasingly gossamer. 46 And by summarily affirming several state court decisions that seemingly approved taxes imposed on exclusively interstate business 147 the Court could have been read as bestowing its own blessing upon such levies.
The high point in these developments was the Court's decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota. 48 The Court held that the commerce clause did not preclude a state from imposing a fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory net income tax upon an out-of-state corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in the taxing State. At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Spector Motor Service v. O 'Connor, 149 where it had invalidated a Connecticut tax similar in virtually every respect to the tax at issue in Northwestern except that it was levied on the privilege of doing business in the state. The distinction the Court perceived between the two cases was that the formal subject 150 of the tax in Northwestern was the corporation's 143 See, e.g., Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) (1946) . The Field Enterprises case is discussed at notes 77-82 supra; the West Publishing case involved the imposition upon West of California's corporate income tax, which was sustained in part on the ground that "a tax on net income from interstate commerce, as distinguished from a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, does not conflict with the commerce clause." 27 Cal. 2d at 709, 166 P.2d at 863. Cf. Stone v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 103 F.2d 544 (5th Cir.), afJ'd per curiam, 308 U.S. 522 (1939) .
148 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 149 340 U.S. 602 (1951). The Northwestern Court stated that it was "beyond dispute that a State may not lay a tax on the 'privilege' of engaging in interstate commerce," and cited Spector. 358 U.S. at 458.
150 The subject is the legal incidence of a tax. It is the thing or event upon which the power to tax is based; the measure of a tax is'the yardstick to which the rate is applied. Subject and measure may be distinct, as in a privilege tax, where the subject is the privilege and the measure is, for example, income; or subject and measure may coindde, as in an income tax, where the income is both the subject upon which the tax power is predicated Copyright 1976 Virginia Law Review, used by permission net income, whereas in Spector it was the privilege of doing business. By continuing to adhere to the holding of Spector, that the commerce clause bars a state from levying a privilege tax, regardless of its measure, upon a corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce within the taxing state, the Court in Northwestern attributed constitutional import to a distinction that lacked economic significance. 5 ' Since the measure of the levies at issue in both Spector and Northwestern was the corporation's net income, the immunity that exclusively interstate commerce enjoyed from state taxation apparently depended on whether the legislative draftsmen called the tax by the right name.' 52 Finally, a growing number of state court decisions that the Supreme Court chose not to disturb in those instances when it was given an opportunity to do so reinforced the conclusion that the commerce clause was no bar to the assertion of a state tax upon exclusively interstate business, when exerted on an apportioned and nondiscriminatory basis, if state legislators were sufficiently sophisticated and state courts sufficiently creative. One court upheld such a tax because it was laid on the right to do business in the "corporate form" as opposed to the privilege of doing business; 153 another did so because the privileges taxed-exercising a corporate franchise, owning property, employing capital, maintaining an office-were distinct from the privilege of engaging in and the basis upon which the amount due is calculated. It is the subject of a tax which has constitutional significance; the measure, at least in theory, has not presented constitutional questions. business "as such"; 154 a third upheld the tax in part on the distinction between the "right to exist" in a state and the privilege of doing business there. 15 Another court in effect rejected the distinction altogether. 1 5 When the Court noted probable jurisdiction in Colonial, which raised the privilege issue almost precisely as it had been raised by a case decided 25 years earlier,' 5 7 one might have surmised that the Court was intent upon rehabilitating the privilege or, alternatively, abandoning it once and for all.
B. The Decision
The Colonial Pipeline Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia, owned and operated a pipeline which carried liquid petroleum from Houston, Texas, to the New York City area. Two hundred fifty-eight miles of the 3,400 mile pipeline were located in Louisiana, as were a number of pumping stations and storage tanks. Colonial also employed a work force in the state of some 25 to 30 mechanics, electricians, and other personnel to service and inspect the line. However, the company had no administrative offices or personnel in Louisiana and did no intrastate business in petroleum products there. 5 8 Louisiana imposed a variety of levies upon Colonial, 159 including its franchise tax, 160 which was measured by the value of the taxpayer's capital stock, surplus, and undivided profits. The state's earlier efforts to tax Colonial under a previous version of legislature's efforts and characterized them as "nothing more than a rephrasing of the general language contained in [the statute] prior to its amendment in 1970." 16s
But the Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed.' 69 It pointed to the omission in the amended statute of the "primary operating incident" of the original statute, i.e., "the privilege of carrying on or doing business," 10 noting that "[t]he thrust of the [amended] statute is to tax not the interstate business done in Louisiana by a foreign corporation, but the doing of business in Louisiana in a corporate form, including 'each and every act, power, right, privilege, or immunity exercised or enjoyed in this state, as an incident to or by virtue of the powers and privileges acquired by the nature of such organizations.' " 171 It concluded that a tax on the doing of business in the corporate form in the state was "sufficiently distinguishable" from a tax on the privilege of doing business in the state to satisfy the strictures of the commerce clause . 2 The taxpayer appealed to the United States Supreme Court. No question was raised about the reasonableness of the apportionment, as determined by an appropriate formula, of the capital employed by Colonial in Louisiana. Nor was there any contention that the tax discriminated against Colonial. And it was conceded that Colonial's business in Louisiana was exclusively interstate. The issue before the Court was therefore dear: can a state impose a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned franchise tax upon an exclusively interstate business for doing business in the corporate form in the state? The resolution of this narrow issue, however, seemed to carry inescapable implications for the resolution of the broader question of whether the tax-immune privilege of doing business was to survive as a viable concept.
Indeed, if resolution of this broader question were not what the Supreme Court had in mind when it decided to give the case plenary consideration, it is puzzling why it bothered to do so. Some 25 years earlier, in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v Copyright 1976 Virginia Law Review, used by permission had upheld a Mississippi franchise tax upon facts as close to Colonial as any lawyer looking for controlling precedent could ever hope to find. Memphis owned and operated an interstate pipeline for the transportation of natural gas; Colonial owned and operated an interstate pipeline for the transportation of liquified petroleum products. Memphis maintained 135 miles of its pipeline in Mississippi, where it engaged exclusively in interstate commerce; Colonial maintained 258 miles of its pipeline in Louisiana, where it also engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. 1 1 Memphis had no office in Mississippi, and its only employees there were those necessary to maintain its pipeline and compressing stations; Colonial maintained no office in Louisiana, and its only employees there were those necessary to maintain its pipeline and pumping stations .
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Mississippi imposed a franchise tax upon, inter alia, every foreign corporation "doing business" in the state, defined "[to] mean and [to] include each and every act, power or privilege exercised or enjoyed in this State, as an incident to, or by virtue of the powers and privileges acquired by the nature of such organization," for "the benefit and protection of the government and laws of the state" that the corporation received; 177 Louisiana imposed a franchise tax upon, inter alia, every foreign corporation "doing business" in the state, defined to "mean and include each and every act, power, right, privilege, or immunity exercised or enjoyed in this state, as an incident to or by virtue of the powers and privileges acquired by the nature of such organizatio[n]," "for the enjoyment, under the protection of the laws of this state, of the powers, rights, privileges and immunities derived by reason of the corporate form of existence and operation." 178 The Supreme Court of Mississippi held in part that its tax was "an exaction ... as a recompense for its protection of ... the local activities in maintaining, keeping in 175 Memphis had one customer in Mississippi to which it sold gas from its interstate line at wholesale from several delivery points. Id. at 81. Colonial had a number of customers in Louisiana, but all deliveries of petroleum products into Louisiana originated outside the state. 289 So. 2d at 94-95.
178 Colonial had once maintained a division office in Baton Rouge prior to the tax years in question. 421 U.S. at 102. repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities of the system throughout the 135 miles of its line in this State"; 1'9 the Supreme Court of Louisiana held in part that its tax was "an exaction... as a recompense for its protection of ... the local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities of th[e] pipeline system throughout the 258 miles of its pipeline in the State of Louisiana." 180 There was no cause for surprise, then, when the Supreme Court, relying principally on its decision in Memphis Natural Gas, affirmed the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Colonial.'"' The Court held that a fairly apportioned nondiscriminatory franchise tax could constitutionally be levied upon an exclusively interstate enterprise for the doing of business in corporate form, since such a tax was not imposed "merely or solely" for the privilege of doing business in Louisiana. 82 In substance, the Court seemed to be saying that where local activities are sufficient to justify the state's taxing a corporation for the privilege of engaging in such activities -in Colonial, as in Memphis, the maintenance of property and employees in the state to service an exclusively interstate pipelinethe state may alternatively levy the tax on the "privileges" associated with the taxpayer's corporate existence within the state. What was surprising, however, was the Court's failure to confront the underlying issue of the continuing vitality of the taximmune status of the privilege of doing interstate business. Instead, the Court engaged in the semantic exercise of distinguishing the doing of business in the corporate form from the bare privilege of doing business. It pointed to the "privileges" associated with corporate existence 184 and noted that these "obviously enhance the value to [Colonial] of its activities within Louisiana." "5 Quite different, in the Court's view, were levies such as those at issue in Spector and the first Colonial case, which suffered from the "fatal constitutional flaw" 's" that they were imposed on the privilege of doing business-even though these were virtually 187 identical in economic impact to those taxes to which it had given its approval. If "[i]t is not a matter of labels," 188 as the Court insisted, then it was a matter of elusive "incidents," I89 "incidences," 190 and "thrusts' 189 421 U.S. at 113 n.9. 190 Id. at 109, 113. This is not to suggest that the economic incidence, of a tax is unimportant; the Court's references, however, were to legal "incidences" bearing no necessary relation to economic reality. Id.
191 Id. at 113.
Copyright 1976 Virginia Law Review, used by permission that are apparently perceptible only to the most advanced constitutional thinkers. Perhaps one could read the Court's opinion more charitably as laying the groundwork for a new departure in commerce clause doctrine. The great weight attributed to the taxpayer's corporate status might be viewed as pointing to the propriety, under the commerce clause, of applying one set of standards to state taxes on the privilege of doing business in the case of corporations and another in the case of unincorporated enterprises. Such a differentiation, although of questionable economic significance, would nevertheless reflect the facts that the states have long subjected corporations to business taxes different from those imposed on individuals and partnerships, 92 and that interstate business is dominated by corporations.. 93 Whatever the merits of such an approach, however, it is not even hinted at in the Colonial opinion. None of the cases considered, including those the Court distinguished, raised the issue; indeed, all but one 114 involved corporations. Furthermore, the concurring and dissenting opinions both cast doubt on the distinction.
9 5 It is therefore highly improbable that the Court intended sub silentio to embrace the suggested rationale.
C. The Tax-Immune Privilege of Doing Interstate BusinessAn Obituary
The root of the difficulty in making sense out of the Court's opinion in Colonial lies in the fact that it amounts essentially to a reductio ad absurdum of its own precedents. In Memphis Gas the Court had found that the "local incidents" of maintaining an interstate pipeline, though admittedly essential to the conduct of that interstate business, 96 were sufficiently separate-"apart from the flow of commerce" 1 97 -to be distinguishable from the privilege of doing business. In General Motors the Court likewise isolated the "local incidents" of establishing and maintaining a sales force as sufficiently distinct aspects "of his [interstate] business which, unlike the privilege of doing interstate business, are subject to the bovereign power of the state." 191 In Colonial the Court, by once again fractionating the concept of doing business so as to create a discrete taxable element that could be differentiated from the taximmune privilege of doing business, for all practical purposes extinguished the privilege itself. To deny that the doing of business in the corporate form is embodied within the privilege of doing business guts the privilege entirely. It is no secret that interstate business is carried on primarily by corporations. Indeed, as of 1965 corporate manufacturing and mercantile activity accounted for 82 percent of all business receipts and 75 percent of all net income originating in these industries. 199 Moreover, by extending the Court's reasoning to distinguish the ownership of property, use of capital, or employment of personnel in a state from the privilege of doing business in the state, one could, in principle, limit the privilege even further to the unincorporated association owning no property in a state where it has no employees. Or, more simply, as Justice Stewart suggested in dissent, one could impose a tax upon an exclusively interstate enterprise doing business in any form "[flor, whatever its form, the exclusively interstate business would still be 'owning or using [a] part of its capital, plant, or other property in Louisiana'... and would still be 'furnished' equivalent 'protection and benefits' by the State .... 200 Furthermore, Colonial itself represents the most dramatic possible illustration of the fact that the tax-immune privilege of doing interstate business has become an illusory abstraction, i.e., the case where a state legislature, with a minimum of wordsmithing, was able to tax the very interstate taxpayer that had successfully resisted imposition of an otherwise identical levy upon identical facts. By approving the amended statute in Colonial, the Court was indeed putting its imprimatur upon "taxation by semantics." 201 Nonetheless, there can be little quarrel with the result in Colonial. Colonial was present in Louisiana, was treated no worse for tax purposes than domestic corporations, and was paying taxes only on that portion of its tax base fairly attributable to Louisiana. If one accepts the principle that an enterprise is entitled to no special tax advantage simply because it does business across state lines, 0 2 then there would appear to be no persuasive objection to the imposition of "nondiscriminatory, properly apportioned state corporate taxes upon foreign corporations doing an exclusively interstate business" 2 03 so long as the requisite nexus requirements are satisfied. 0 4 This conclusion simply recognizes that a state should be entitled to demand from an enterprise that carries on business there "its just share of the cost of state government upon which [it] necessarily relies and by which it is furnished protection and benefits" 205 with respect to the property it owns, the personnel it employs, or the market it exploits.
In the end, while Justice Stewart properly upbraided the Court for its "specious reasoning," 206 it is unlikely that the respect the Court paid to the tax-immune privilege of doing interstate business will mislead anybody. After reading Colonial, only the most sanguine taxpayer would conclude that the Court maintains a serious belief in the doctrine that the privilege of doing interstate business is immune from state taxation. And in light of the compelling case for abandoning it altogether in favor of the position the Court has in effect adopted, 20 7 the demise of the doctrine (or its comatose condition) is no cause for grief. [Vol. 62:149 Colonial. Perhaps the Court noted probable jurisdiction in these two cases with the thought that they did indeed raise basic problems with respect to the constitutional limitations on state tax authority over interstate business. Perhaps after taking another look at these "perennial" problems, it in effect concluded that over the course of the 150 years during which it had handed down scores of decisions on these or closely related questions, it had accomplished substantially what it was capable of accomplishing in the area. Perhaps the Court further concluded that what it had accomplished struck a fair balance between the key competing interests-those of the states for a contribution to the costs of government from enterprises enjoying benefits within their borders and those of the federal system for the maintenance of a free flow of commerce among the states. And perhaps the Court finally concluded that further improvements or refinements in the balance were beyond the pale of judicial competence 217 and must come, if at all, from other bodies.
All this, of course, is speculation. However, it is the kind of speculation that lawyers get paid for doing, and there is some evidence to suggest that these decisions mark a strategic retreat by the Court from the battles that once raged over the scope of the constitutional limitations upon the states' power to tax an interstate enterprise. First, there was but a single dissenting opinion in the course of the two decisions, although both raised issues that had sharply divided the Court in the recent past. The principal precedent upon which the unanimous Court in Standard Pressed Steel relied as "almost precisely in point" was the 5-4 decision in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 2 18 decided a decade earlier, and the principal precedent upon which the majority in Colonial Pipeline relied was the three-man plurality opinion in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone 219 which had been joined by two concurrences and opposed by four dissents. The present near- Copyright 1976 Virginia Law Review, used by permission unanimity of the Court thus represents a dramatic departure from its past performance in this area, which was described a few years ago in the following terms:
The present posture of the Court is characteristic of its entire history in dealing with Commerce Clause tax issues-the great issues involved reflect sharp differences in approach among the Justices, the leading cases are decided by slim majorities over strong dissent, and both the rationale and holdings are fluid and dynamic, with one decade's minority becoming the next decade's majority, only to be displaced in another decade by a new majority. 220 Moreover, this new harmony may not be attributed simply to the shifting membership on the bench. 2 2 ' Additional pieces of evidence emerge from the nature and quality of opinions in the cases. Their failure to address the underlying questions and their unembarrassed reliance upon discredited doctrine seem to reflect the Court's intellectual exhaustion with the issues raised. And for a Court that has not spared the printer when it comes to issues in which it has a strong interest, 222 one can reasonably infer that its willingness to do so on issues that once commanded such interest reveals an altered attitude.
Finally, there are the holdings of the cases. Both Standard and Colonial represented an extension of the state's taxing power over interstate business to or beyond the limits that the Supreme Court had previously countenanced under the commerce and due process clauses. By approving the imposition of an unapportioned gross receipts tax upon an interstate business predicated upon the activities of a single in-state employee, Standard substantially reduced the interstate taxpayer's ability to resist such a tax. By approving the imposition of a franchise tax on an exclusively interstate business for the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, Colonial narrowed the tax-immune privilege of doing business to the vanishing point. If the Court were determined to continue to 220 J. HELLESEN, supra note 4, at 169. 221 Justices Brennan, Stewart, and White, who dissented in General Motors, joined the majority in Standard Pressed Steel. play an active role in policing the exercise of state taxing power over interstate business, it is hardly likely that it would have had so little difficulty in upholding the state court decisions in Standard and Colonial.
In sum, while the Court's adoption of a policy of "benign neglect" towards state taxation of interstate business has hardly been established, there is sufficient evidence in the record to suggest the possibility.
22 3 Conceivably the Court has been influenced by the collaborative efforts of the states in recent years and by the prospects of congressional legislation designed to achieve a greater degree of uniformity in state taxation of interstate business. 2 24 While the success of such efforts had thus far been limited, they offer at least the possibility of comprehensive solutions to the basic problems in this field, something the judiciary-even at its most resourceful-is institutionally incapable of providing. 224 See note 22 supra. 225 See note 217 supra.
